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Logical Transition Examples—To Provide Another Point

Does enumerating your supporting reasons with  “First . . . Second . . . Third . . .” feel too stilted and wooden? Instead, try sprinkling in some of these transition phrases to increase flow and supply a conversational feel.

  • Case citations have been replaced by “. . .” to shorten these passages and to allow you to digest them more easily.


  1. Example from Justice Scalia: “It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live. Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.”
  2. Example from Jessica Amunson: “This ‘general rule . . . prevents a court from adding terms or provisions to the contract.’ . . . Additionally, as in the case of statutory interpretation, when a contract contains ‘a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand,’ the ‘sensible inference’ is that ‘the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.’”
  3. Example from Yar Chaikovsky: “Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit, as there is no disclosure of the purported inventions receiving messages other than over telephone lines. Plaintiffs additionally maintain that the invocation of ‘the present invention . . . involves . . .’ language is ‘equally equivocal’ as the language in Unwired Planet: ‘the present invention relates to . . . .’ Plaintiffs ignore controlling law to the contrary in equating ‘involves,’ a directive, with ‘relates to,’ a reference.”


  1. Example from Justice Kagan: “The Court of Appeals explained that the ESQD information ‘is predominantly used for the internal purpose of instructing agency personnel on how to do their jobs.’ . . . And disclosure of the material, the court determined, ‘would risk circumvention of the law’ by ‘point[ing] out the best targets for those bent on wreaking havoc’—for example, ‘[a] terrorist who wished to hit the most damaging target.’”
  2. Example from Lisa Blatt: “Congress determined, then, that when selecting a remedy and choosing the substantive cleanup thresholds to apply, EPA has the authority to override state law. And respondents have never claimed that EPA failed to account for Montana law in this fashion here.”
  3. Example from Paul Clement: Fortunately, that vision finds no support in this Court’s cases. Indeed, the government does not deny that Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), rejected the same implied-repeal argument in the context of a comparable challenge to the structure and existence of a federal agency. And the absence of a district-court remedy in such circumstances would condemn parties like Axon to suffer constitutional injury without any means of obtaining adequate or meaningful relief. Nothing in the FTC Act (or the Administrative Procedure Act) supports that untenable result.”

Along with

  1. Example from Justice Scalia: “Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in gross just because a relator is an original source with respect to some claim. We, along with every court to have addressed the question, conclude that § 3730(e)(4) does not permit such claim smuggling.”
  2. Example from Justice Kagan: “Should the appellate court allow the intervention? Our precedent, along with common sense, suggests not—even though the timely-appeal rule, as noted above, does not address issues of intervention.”
  3. Example from Justice Gorsuch: “In doing so, subparagraph (D)’s later-in-time and more general reference to ‘constitutional claims or questions of law’ across a full chapter of the U. S. Code did nothing to disturb subparagraph (B)(i)’s targeted application to judgments ‘regarding the granting of relief’ under § 1255. Instead, the statutes work in tandem. The majority’s approach ignores this conclusion, and along with it subparagraph (B)(i)’s specific language.”


  1. Example from Justice Kagan: “That makes Abramski’s misrepresentation on Question 11.a. material under §922(a)(6). And because that statement pertained to information that a dealer must keep in its permanent records under the firearms law, Abramski’s answer to Question 11.a. also violated §924(a)(1)(A).”
  2. Example from Lisa Blatt: “This result would destroy a central feature of CERCLA, which permits EPA to act quickly to clean up toxic waste sites and to determine ultimate liability later. That interpretation would also force every landowner at a site to shoulder the burden of defending and settling CERCLA litigation. And it would recklessly cede unsupervised control over hazardous sites to individual community members—even if the rest of the community supports EPA’s plan.”
  3. Example from Neal Katyal: “Specifically, Sections 3(c), 5(a)-(c), and 5(e) reflect blatant state-sanctioned preference for Christian refugees and disfavor toward Muslims, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. They also fail to provide appropriate protections for those detained pursuant to the Executive Order and thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Another reason

  1. Example from Justice Thomas: “These instances of retaliation sufficiently demonstrate why this Court should invalidate mandatory disclosure and reporting requirements. But amici present evidence of yet another reason to do so—the threat of retaliation from elected officials.”
  2. Example from Justice Kavanaugh: “The dissent’s rhetoric of disenfranchisement is misplaced for still another reason. As the dissent uses that term, the dissent’s own position would itself ‘disenfranchise’ voters. What about voters who request an absentee ballot after October 29? What about voters who mail their ballots after November 3? What about voters who mail their ballots by November 3 but whose ballots arrive after November 9?”
  3. Example from Justice Gorsuch:Another reason counsels hesitation, too. Helix Energy does not just dispute the proper application of various regulations. It contends those regulations are inconsistent with and unsustainable under the terms of the statute on which they are purportedly based.”

As well (as)

  1. Example from Justice Scalia: “Striking the right balance between safety and efficacy is especially difficult with respect to vaccines, which affect public as well as individual health.”
  2. Example from Justice Kagan: “And the term ‘covered security’ refers to a security listed on a national stock exchange. . . . So taken all in all, §77p(b) completely disallows (in both state and federal courts) sizable class actions that are founded on state law and allege dishonest practices respecting a nationally traded security’s purchase or sale. Next, §77p(c) provides for the removal of certain class actions to federal court, as well as for their subsequent disposition: ‘Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b) of this section.’”
  3. Example from Neal Katyal: “Respondents foresee a parade of horribles that would follow a holding that specific jurisdiction requires a causal connection. This Court has rejected similar doomsaying before. . . . Here, at least eight federal courts of appeals covering 37 States, as well as the majority of state high courts to have addressed the issue, already require a causal connection. . . . And those jurisdictions have escaped respondents’ apocalypse.”


  1. Example from Joshua Rosenkranz: “So the cases the Government invokes do not apply, and there is no reason to think Congress expected they would. Besides, no court has ever held that subpoenas may reach private correspondence stored with a custodian in a foreign country.”
  2. Example from Lisa Blatt: “The fact that settling companies might not ‘admit liability’ (Opp. 33) has no bearing on whether the settlement constitutes ‘money remuneration.’ Besides, settlements can be entered in the form of a judgment, and judgments can be subsequently altered through settlement.”
  3. Example from David Frederick: “Petitioner’s contention (at 10-18) that bargaining with the government is always ‘political speech’ fails to appreciate this key distinction. Besides, petitioner’s premise that all collective bargaining raises matters of public concern contradicts reality.”


  1. Example from Chief Justice Roberts: “We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.”
  2. Example from Justice Kagan: “More concretely, Mach Mining’s proposed code of conduct conflicts with the latitude Title VII gives the Commission to pursue voluntary compliance with the law’s commands. Every aspect of Title VII’s conciliation provision smacks of flexibility. To begin with, the EEOC need only ‘endeavor’ to conciliate a claim, without having to devote a set amount of time or resources to that project. §2000e–5(b). Further, the attempt need not involve any specific steps or measures; rather, the Commission may use in each case whatever ‘informal’ means of ‘conference, conciliation, and persuasion’ it deems appropriate.”
  3. Example from Lisa Blatt: “The court considered judges ill-equipped to make ‘inherently subjective’ judgments about an artist’s ‘intent’; or ‘meaning.’ . . . Further, derivative works (like movie adaptations of books) often ‘transform the aesthetic and message of the underlying’ work—but are not automatically fair use.”


  1. Example from Justice Jackson: “As for irreparable harm, Johnson’s execution irrevocably mooted our consideration of his due process claim, and Missouri would have suffered no discernible harm if a stay had issued, as a State has no legitimate interest in carrying out an execution contrary to § 547.031 or due process. Furthermore, Johnson had the better of the equities, since he diligently pursued his claims, and the last-minute nature of his motion for a stay was neither attributable to him nor due to factors within his control.”
  2. Example from Justice Breyer: “Not only does that reading lack a clear statutory basis but the second sentence goes on to empower the CDC to take ‘other measures, as in [its] judgment may be necessary.’ . . . Furthermore, reading the provision’s second sentence to narrow its first would undermine Congress’ purpose.”
  3. Example from Justice Kavanaugh: “The hospitals noted that Congress had never singled out 340B hospitals for lower Medicare reimbursements for outpatient prescription drugs. Nor, until 2018, had HHS ever done so. Furthermore, the 340B hospitals asserted that reducing their reimbursement rates for prescription drugs would force those hospitals to eliminate or dramatically curtail other crucial programs that provide a wide range of medical services in low-income and rural communities—such as treatments for cancer, mental health issues, opioid addiction, and diabetes.”

In addition

  1. Example from Justice Scalia: “In those circumstances, there is no reason to regard either party’s injury as derivative of the other’s; each is directly and independently harmed by the attack on its merchandise. In addition, Static Control adequately alleged proximate causation by alleging that it designed, manufactured, and sold microchips that both (1) were necessary for, and (2) had no other use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner cartridges.”
  2. Example from Justice Kagan: “First, a district court may not ‘award[ ] attorney’s fees as a matter of course’; rather, a court must make a more particularized, case-by-case assessment. . . . Second, a court may not treat prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants any differently; defendants should be ‘encouraged to litigate [meritorious copyright defenses] to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.’ . . . In addition, we noted with approval ‘several nonexclusive factors’ to inform a court’s fee-shifting decisions: ‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness[,] and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’”
  3. Example from Neal Katyal: “Sections 3(c) and 3(e)-(f) of the Order plainly flunk that test. They are premised on differentiating among people based on national origin: People from certain countries can enter the United States, and people from other countries cannot. In addition, those provisions as well as Sections 5(a) and (c) treat people differently because of their religion: They are intentionally structured in a way that blocks Muslims while allowing Christians.”


  1. Example from Chief Justice Roberts: “Justice Ginsburg contends that if the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over the Longs’ other claims, it is hard to understand why jurisdiction would not also extend to the discrimination claim. . . . First, we have not said the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over the other claims: That question is not before us and we decline to speculate as to its answer. Moreover, the claims on which the Longs prevailed concern breach of a loan agreement, see App. 190, and bad faith in connection with Bureau of Indian Affairs loan guarantees, . . . The present claim involves substantive regulation of the sale of fee land.”
Example from Paul Clement: The same logic applies here. The courts’ ability to provide limited relief later does not preclude access to more complete and meaningful relief now. . . . Moreover, a remedy that stops constitutional injury before it happens is far more appropriate and targeted. A party subject to a cease-and-desist order may ultimately deserve to have its conduct halted, but no one deserves to suffer constitutional injury at the hands of an unconstitutional agency.”
  1. Example from Justice Kavanuagh: “A right to interlocutory appeal of the arbitrability issue without an automatic stay of the district court proceedings is therefore like a lock without a key, a bat without a ball, a computer without a keyboard—in other words, not especially sensible. From the Judiciary’s institutional perspective, moreover, allowing a case to proceed simultaneously in the district court and the court of appeals creates the possibility that the district court will waste scarce judicial resources— which could be devoted to other pressing criminal or civil matters—on a dispute that will ultimately head to arbitration in any event.”


  1. Example from Chief Justice Roberts: “In this case, the dissent—for a grab bag of no less than seven reasons—would tell us that this particular ICJ judgment is federal law. . . . That is no sort of guidance. Nor is it any answer to say that the federal courts will diligently police international agreements and en force the decisions of international tribunals only when they should be enforced.”
  2. Example from Justice Kagan: “Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.’ . . . Nor can deterrence do the work in this context, because ‘the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults’—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.”
  3. Example from Paul Clement: “The FTC itself is authorized to invoke that jurisdiction in specified circumstances, . . . , which underscores that there is nothing incompatible between FTC-related proceedings and district courts. Nor does anything in the statutory text even hint at the notion that it is designed to strip district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to the constitutionality of the agency itself, i.e., to the FTC’s very power to act. To the contrary, the text reflects a narrow focus on challenges to a specific form of agency action that is often, but not always, the source of the would-be challenger’s injury: FTC cease-and-desist orders.”

What is more

  1. Example from Justice Scalia: “Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.4 What is more, in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”
  2. Example from Chief Justice Roberts: “Even if that candidate opted to spend less than the initial public-financing cap, any spending by independent expenditure groups to promote the privately financed candidate’s election—regardless whether such support was welcome or helpful—could trigger matching funds. What is more, that state money would go directly to the publicly funded candidate to use as he saw fit.”
  3. Example from Justice Kagan: “After we granted certiorari, we discovered that S.G. has ‘moved to Florida, and ha[s] no intention of relocating back to Oregon.’ . . . What is more, S.G. is now only months away from her 18th birthday—and, presumably, from her high school graduation.”